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Punishment is a potential mechanism to stabilise cooperation between self-
regarding agents. Theoretical and empirical studies on the importance of a punitive 
reputation have yielded conflicting results. Here, we propose that a variety of 
factors interact to explain why a punitive reputation is sometimes beneficial and 
sometimes harmful. We predict that benefits are most likely to occur in forced play 
scenarios and in situations where punishment is the only means to convey an 
individual’s cooperative intent and willingness to uphold fairness norms. In 
contrast, if partner choice is possible and an individual's cooperative intent can be 
inferred directly, then individuals with a non-punishing cooperative reputation 
should typically be preferred over punishing cooperators. 
 
The puzzle of punishment 
Punishment is a mechanism that can promote cooperation where individuals would 
otherwise be tempted to cheat [1-3]. Humans are apparently willing to engage in costly 
punishment of others and derive subjective pleasure from doing so [4, 5]. However, since 
punishment imposes immediate costs on punishers, two important issues arise that are 
central in both theoretical and empirical studies. First, one has to elucidate how punishers 
are eventually compensated for their investment. In repeated games, punishers can 
directly benefit if the target behaves more cooperatively in the future as a consequence of 
being punished. This logic applies to both 2-player and n-player games [2, 6], though in 
the latter punishment might be under negative frequency dependence as exemplified in a 
volunteer’s dilemma [7-9]. In one-shot games, it has been argued that punishment can 
only evolve through higher level population processes (e.g. [10, 11]) that are ultimately 
based on increasing the punisher's inclusive fitness [12]. The second issue concerns the 
fact that punishment by definition destroys value [13], even more so if it leads to counter-
punishment rather than cooperation, as frequently observed in experiments on humans 
(e.g. [14-18]). While the theoretical literature provides conflicting results on the evolvability 
of vendetta strategies as opposed to co-evolution between cooperating and punishing 
defectors [19-21], one has to ask under what conditions punishment could be favoured 
over alternative non-destructive or even value-building control mechanisms like reciprocal 
defection, rewarding co-operators or compensating victims (e.g. [13, 16, 22-25]). Here, we 
are particularly concerned with peer punishment and ignore the evolution of centralized 
punishment institutions, although we note that similar arguments to those that we make 
about peer punishment might also apply to centralized punishment (e.g. see [1, 26]). We 
explore under what conditions a punitive reputation could facilitate or hinder the evolution 
and maintenance of punishment as a partner control mechanism. As all empirical evidence 
on the reputation consequences of punishment is limited to humans, we do not discuss 
punishment in other species. 
  
The reputation of punishers 
It has been argued that many of the difficulties in reconciling the immediate costs of 
punishing with ultimate fitness benefits to the punisher can be overcome if interactions are 
not anonymous as punishers can then benefit from acquiring a punitive reputation. 
Reputation generally offers one major solution to the question of why humans cooperate: 
helping others improves an individual's reputation, which in turn increases the probability 
of receiving help from observers or being chosen as cooperation partners [27-29]. In much 
the same way, theoretical models of 2-player and n-player games have shown that when 
individuals are forced to interact with one another and can infer how the partner is likely to 
behave by observing whether the partner punished in previous interaction(s), then 
punishment can evolve via direct reputation-based benefits to the punisher (e.g. [11, 21, 
22, 24, 30, 31]). According to these models, strategies that respond conditionally to the 
punitive reputation of the partner (by cooperating when paired with a punisher but 
defecting when paired with a non-punisher) typically outperform unconditionally 
cooperative or defecting strategies because individuals can avoid the risk of being 
punished but accrue the benefits of defecting otherwise. Punishers benefit from investing 
in responsible punishment because being identified as a punisher reduces the risk that an 
opportunistic partner will defect. The possibility for individuals to benefit from acquiring a 
punitive reputation catalyses the emergence of responsible punishment while preventing 
the spread of antisocial and spitefully punishing strategies (see [21]; Glossary). The latter 
would otherwise be expected to outperform responsible punishment strategies (e.g. [19, 
20]).  
 
Empirical data on the reputation consequences of punishment are quite mixed. While 
some studies support the idea proposed by the theoretical models that individuals benefit 
from a punitive reputation because future partners are deterred from cheating (e.g., [32, 
33]), findings from other studies are less straightforward to interpret. For example, 
punishers have been demonstrated to both advertise [34, 35] and hide [36] punitive 
behaviour, the former findings hinting that punishment yields reputation benefits while the 
latter indicates otherwise. While punishers are generally trusted more than non-punishers 
(e.g. [37, 38]) various studies have failed to provide evidence that punishers are liked or 
rewarded for their investment [32, 37, 39-42]. Nevertheless, a recent article based on 
evaluations of vignettes indicated that third-party punishers were judged as more likeable 
than those who either did not apprehend cheats or who were the victim of the cheat 
themselves [43]; while another empirical study has also shown that bystanders are more 
likely to reward third-party punishers than individuals who take no action in response to a 
cheat [Raihani & Bshary, in review]. A possible conclusion to draw from the findings of 
these models and empirical studies is that individuals can benefit from a punitive 
reputation in some contexts but not others. Here, we provide a conceptual framework 
(Figure 1; Box 1) that integrates existing theoretical and empirical knowledge when 
possible but also makes predictions for hitherto unexplored scenarios (Table 1). While 
necessarily somewhat speculative in nature, our framework will hopefully inspire both 
further experimentation and modelling. We suggest that to understand the reputation 
consequences of punishment it is necessary to first determine what kind of information can 
be extracted by observers regarding the potential motive underpinning the decision to 
punish before assessing when, and why, such a reputation is beneficial or harmful to the 
punisher. As argued by [44], motives can be spiteful, self-serving, other-regarding or a 
mixture, and some situations might allow less ambiguous assessments than others. 
Therefore, punishment can be more or less indicative of an individual’s cooperative 
tendencies and fairness preferences (as suggested by [38, 44]). As a consequence, a 
punitive reputation might have diverse effects on the future behaviour of observers, both 
regarding their willingness to engage in interactions with the punisher if partner choice is 
an option, and their willingness to cooperate in forced play scenarios. A central unresolved 
question is whether a punitive reputation would ever induce observers to voluntarily help or 
reward punishers in the absence of any punishment threat.   
 What does punishment signal? 
Punishment might always signal that the punisher is willing to incur costs to harm others. 
However, on its own this information is not helpful to observers in predicting how punishers 
might behave in future. Instead, we suggest that observers need to know about the context 
in which punishment occurred in order to infer what motivated the punishment decision 
and how the punisher is therefore likely to behave in subsequent interactions. We predict 
that punishment can affect reputation in two ways: it can signal that the punisher is 
competitive or, under more restricted circumstances, can signal the punisher's cooperative 
intent. We predict that observers only infer cooperative intent from punishment if 
competitive motives can be excluded. To verify this prediction and thereby understand the 
reputation consequences of punishment, it is crucial for both empirical studies and 
theoretical models to vary the nature of the game in which a punitive reputation is built.  
 
If a punisher is directly and actively involved in the game where punishment occurs, 
observers can gain information about the punisher’s own behaviour (cooperate or defect), 
whether the punishment is potentially self-serving (one-off interaction versus iterated 
game), and whether the punisher is the only beneficiary of their investment or whether 
others benefit as well (2 player or n-player game). If an individual is directly but passively 
involved in the game (e.g. a potential recipient of helping, as in [32]), observers can only 
assess whether a punisher acted against a helping or a non-helping partner and whether 
there are potential personal or shared future benefits of doing so, but not whether the 
punisher would cooperate or defect herself. Finally, if an individual was a third-party, 
observers can assess whether the punishment was justified or not but cannot assess 
whether the individual would cooperate or defect herself. We predict that punishment is 
most likely to serve as a proxy for the cooperative tendency of the punisher when (i) 
punishment is aimed at defectors and not cooperators; (ii) the cooperative tendency of the 
punisher cannot be directly observed; and (iii) the punisher was not the primary victim of 
the cheat (Figure 1; Box 1). Some empirical evidence supports these predictions: 
antisocial punishment and retaliatory punishment (where the punisher is the victim of the 
cheat) have both been shown to correlate with competitive, rather than cooperative, 
motives [45-48]. Data are currently lacking as to whether investment in third-party 
punishment is a reliable signal of cooperative tendency, as predicted (but see [Jordan et 
al., under review] for supportive evidence). 
 
We propose that another important potential signalling aspect of punishment is linked to its 
efficiency. Empirical studies typically use a fee to fine ratio that is larger than one (e.g. [4, 
14, 16 - 18, 25, 32, 34 - 41]). This approach has been adopted in some recent models [30, 
31] while early theoretical papers show that it is not a necessity for the evolution of punitive 
reputations [11, 22]. A fee to fine ratio larger than one indicates that punishing is cheaper 
than being punished and, for ease, we henceforth refer to this as an 'efficient' punishment 
regime. This assumption certainly helps the evolution of punishment when individuals are 
forced to interact with one another and the reputation consequences of punishment induce 
opportunistic cooperators (individuals who cooperate only under the threat of punishment) 
to cooperate. However, since efficient punishment always improves the punisher's payoff's 
relative to those of the target, we suggest that punishers always face the observers’ doubt 
concerning the moral value of the act [49, 50]. Even for third-party punishment, where the 
punisher was not the victim of the defection, observers could conclude that the motivation 
behind the punishment is jealousy and the punisher's aim is to reduce the asymmetry 
between their own and the defector’s payoff (e.g. [51]). Previous work has shown that 
third-party punishers that incur high costs (relative to their initial endowment) to punish 
cheats are preferred over those that incur lower costs [38], which is consistent with the 
idea that observers take the relative cost of punishment into account when evaluating the 
punisher. When punishment is efficient, we predict that third-party punishers will be 
evaluated less positively than third-party individuals who help the victim instead, a 
prediction which is supported by a recent experiment using a 4:1 fee-to-fine ratio for both 
third-party punishment and third-party helping [Raihani & Bshary, under review]. Fittingly, 
recent studies have also shown that that when third-parties are given the option to either 
punish a cheat or to compensate the victim, more people choose the latter [25, 52; Raihani 
& Bshary, under review], with the option to reverse the fortunes of the cheat and victim, 
when available, being the most popular [53].  
 
How does the punitive signal affect the behaviour of observers? 
We have argued that punishment could serve as a competitive signal (highlighting the 
punisher's willingness to incur costs to admonish others) and, in more restricted 
circumstances, as a signal of cooperative intent. These two different signals are likely to 
have different impacts on the emotions induced in observers and - accordingly - will 
determine whether the punitive reputation is helpful or harmful to the punisher. To 
determine the reputation consequences of punishment the next step is to investigate the 
rules of the second game in which former observers interact with initial players. We 
consider three factors as potentially important. First, what kind of game is played? Second, 
can observers choose their interaction partners? Third, is punishment an option in the 
second game? The existing theoretical and empirical literature agrees on one main result. 
Where punishment is justified, efficient punishment can stabilise cooperation and typically 
outcompetes other partner control mechanisms if individuals are forced to interact with one 
another and punishment will be possible in the next game [9, 17, 18, 20, 26-28]. Crucially, 
however, although most experiments reveal that efficient punishers tend to be trusted by 
others (e.g. [37, 38]), they are not necessarily liked more than cooperative non-punishers 
[37, 39] or rewarded for their investment [32, 39 - 42]. Taken together, these results lead us 
to conclude that it is fear (but not love) induced in observers that renders a punitive 
reputation beneficial to the punisher in forced-play games with punishment options. The 
question of whether a punitive reputation can induce love in observers, leading to 
voluntary help or cooperation even when punishment is no longer a threat, is still open. 
Recent evidence suggests that third-party punishers are liked more than individuals that 
do not punish cheats [43] but it is not known whether uninvolved bystanders would pay to 
reward these individuals for their punitive investment (but see [Raihani & Bshary, under 
review]).  
 
To our knowledge, no theoretical study and few empirical studies have asked how a 
punisher's reputation affects the possibility to be chosen as a partner. Assuming that 
individuals prefer to choose cooperative partners for interactions, we expect that punishers 
will only be preferred over non-punishers where punishment reliably signals cooperative 
intent in the absence of more direct information on a potential partner’s cooperative 
behaviour. In the absence of opportunities to perform positive actions, third-party 
punishers are preferred over non-punishers for interactions (e.g. [38]) and are more likely 
to punish when their decision is made known to others (e.g. [34, 35]). Conversely, 
punishers might be less preferred as partners when cooperative intent can be signalled 
through positive actions instead, or when punishment can be interpreted as competitive. 
The findings of a recent study by Rockenbach & Milinski [36] partially support this 
prediction. In this study, individuals that signalled cooperative intent through contributions 
to the public good paid to conceal (severe) punishment from prospective observing 
partners, hinting that people believed that their punitive decisions would be evaluated 
negatively. Observers joined the group in the next round and could exclude one player 
from the initial team of four from the interaction. Apparently, punitive behaviour by players 
did not affect the observers’ choice of who to exclude. Instead, observers excluded 
partners based on low contributions to the public good rather than punishment [36]. Thus, 
while this study shows that cooperative individuals are preferred over non-cooperative 
individuals it does not tell us how cooperative punishers are evaluated relative to 
cooperative non-punishers. To properly evaluate the reputation consequences of 
punishment, while holding information about the partner's cooperativeness constant, would 
require a new study where the observer is forced to actively choose one player out of four 
rather than excluding one player out of four. We predict that when punishment is efficient, 
observers will prefer non-punishing cooperators if a) they themselves are defectors; b) the 
game to be played is a 2-player game; or c) the observer knows that all other partners are 
cooperative in an n-player game. The latter two predictions are based on standard 
arguments in the theoretical literature that both execution and perception errors are part of 
life [54, 55], which in turn would lower the observer’s payoff if he chooses a partner who 
has punishment in his repertoire. Conversely, we predict that observers will prefer to 
include punishing cooperators in n-player interactions when there is a risk that other 
members of the future group are defectors or opportunistic co-operators. The optimal 
number of punishers to include is likely to depend on whether linear or non-linear benefits 
of punishment are assumed [7]. In the absence of punishment options, we assume that 
models would predict a positive effect of a punitive reputation only in the absence of direct 
information on cooperative tendencies, and that this effect will be more pronounced if 
punishment is inefficient since inefficient punishment more easily allows competitive 
motives to be ruled out. When both punitive and cooperative information is present - but 
punishment is no longer an option - punitive scores should be ignored. However, as our 
reputation concept is psychological in nature, we would also predict that in empirical 
studies a purely cooperative reputation outcompetes a punitive reputation that is based on 
fear, while justified and inefficient punishment might cause no disadvantage or potentially 
even an advantage in terms of partner choice. It is clear that more theoretical and 
empirical work is needed to clarify the circumstances under which a punitive reputation is 
beneficial, particularly when partner choice is possible (Table 1).  
 
Concluding remarks 
Our framework identifies key parameters that might affect the reputation effects of 
punishment. We expect that observers will infer competitive motives of punishers unless 
these can be ruled out. According to our predictions, competitive punishers might be 
respected but also feared by observers, whereas cooperative punishers are more likely to 
be loved. Being feared should be beneficial in forced play games but could be harmful if 
observers can avoid the punisher for future interactions. Conversely, punishers that are 
truly loved could be evaluated in a similar manner to helpful individuals and thus 
preferentially selected for interactions by observers. Partner choice might therefore hold 
the key for understanding why individuals sometimes advertise punishment but conceal 
their actions at other times and the field would benefit hugely from more theoretical models 
and empirical studies exploring this possibility. Perhaps most importantly, whereas 
punishers might gain benefits from being feared in enforced games, it is still an open 
question whether there are conditions where they will benefit from being loved. 
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Box 1. The punisher's image score 
 
Image scores associated with helping behaviours have typically been modelled as either 
positive or negative, where individuals with positive image scores are more likely to 
receive help from observers than individuals with negative image scores [27]. Individuals 
with an image score of zero are perceived neutrally by observers. We suggest that the 
image score associated with punishment depends on the emotions that observers 
experience towards the punisher and the context of the next interaction (Figure 1; Table 1). 
For ease, we have assumed that punishers can evoke the emotions of hatred, love or fear 
in observers, depending on the available information (though we note that this assumption 
requires empirical validation). Evoking the emotion of hatred is expected to be associated 
with negative image score; while evoking the emotion of love should have positive 
consequences for punishers. However, we suggest that evoking the emotion of fear in 
observers could be either beneficial or harmful to the punisher depending on whether 
observers are forced to interact with the punisher or can avoid them (Table 1).  
 Defecting punishers or individuals who punish cooperators might induce purely negative 
emotions like hate and disgust. Individuals who punish defectors could receive respect but 
also some fear as long as competitive motives underpinning punishment cannot be ruled 
out by observers (e.g. if the punisher was the victim of the cheat or will interact with the 
cheat in future). Although (justified) third-party punishment should usually be evaluated 
more positively than retaliatory punishment, even the moral legitimacy of third-party 
punishers will be called into question by observers if punishers stand to increase their 
payoff relative to that of the target (i.e. where punishment is efficient, [48, 50]). In contrast, 
'inefficient' punishment (fee to fine ratio < 1, red arrows in Figure 1) should remove the 
doubt that punishment is motivated by a self-serving desire to improve relative payoffs. 
Under these circumstances, an individual could use justified punishment to signal reliably 
their willingness to uphold fairness norms and other-regarding preferences (e.g. [49]). 
Thus, inefficient punishers could achieve image scores as high as helpers, and the 
combination of inefficient punishment and helping might even yield the highest score, and 
hence evoke voluntary help in the absence of any punishment threats. This possibility 
needs both empirical and theoretical exploration, using experiments that dissociate 
reputation consequences of helping from reputation consequences of punishing. To date, 
most empirical studies on the effects of a punitive reputation have demonstrated that 
punishers induce fear in bystanders (e.g. [32, 33] but see [43]) rather than exploring 






Altruistic punishment: typically used to describe punishment that occurs in n-player 
games, such as the public goods game (see below). Punishment is described as altruistic 
because the punisher pays the cost of punishment while any benefits of increased within-
group cooperation are shared among punishers and non-punishers. Note that punishment 
need not impose lifetime fitness costs on punishers and is therefore not necessarily 
altruistic in the true sense of the word. 
 
Antisocial punishment: punishment that is aimed at individuals whose actions benefit, 
rather than harm, the group. 
 
Cooperation: the outcome of a social interaction in which all players gain lifetime direct 
fitness benefits.  
 
Public Goods Game: an n-player game where individuals make contributions to a 
communal venture. Collective benefits are greatest if everyone contributes to the resource 
but individuals do best to withhold investment and free-ride on the investments of others.  
 
Punishment: the act of paying to reduce the payoff of another individual. There are many 
ways that a punisher might ultimately gain direct fitness benefits from this investment. 
Efficient punishment: fee to fine ratio > 1; inefficient punishment: fee to fine ratio ≤ 1. 
 
Reputation: information about the previous behaviour of an individual that can be used to 
predict how they might behave in future. 
 
Sanction: involves harming another individual but without incurring the cost involved in 
punishment.  
 
Third-party punishment: typically refers to a scenario where a cheating individual is 
punished by an uninvolved bystander.  
 
Trust Game: a two-player game where the Truster is endowed with a sum of money which 
they can entrust to the Trustee. Any money sent to the Trustee is multiplied by the 
experimenter and the Trustee can then choose how much of the endowment to send back 
to the Truster. Mutual benefits are highest if the Truster trusts the Trustee and the Trustee 
returns half the endowment to the Truster. However, Trustees gain higher payoffs by 
keeping any money endowed to them and Trusters are thus selected to not trust.  
 
Volunteer's Dilemma: n-player Public Goods Game where the benefit of the public good 
is produced so long as one player chooses to cooperate. Benefits thus follow a non-linear 





Are there conditions under which punishers might be rewarded for their actions by third-
parties? If so, what are these conditions? 
 
Under what circumstances, if any, are cooperative punishers preferred over cooperative 
non-punishers for interactions? 
 
To what extent is justified punishment indicative of the punisher's future cooperative 
behaviour? 
 
Figure 1: We propose that the reputation consequences of punishment depend on the 
punisher’s role (active or passive) and behaviour in the game in which the reputation is 
built, on the type of  game (2-player game, n-player game, 3rd party intervention) and on 
the fee to fine ratio (>1 or ≤1, indicated by black and red arrows, respectively). Depending 
on the combination of these factors a punisher might acquire a reputation for being 
antisocial, competitive or cooperative; and evoke hatred, fear or love in observers as a 
consequence. 
 
Table 1: We predict how individuals will react to their co-players, depending on the co-
player's punishment reputation, and on the strategic nature of the following interaction. To 
this end, we assume that individuals know their co-players' punishment reputation from the 
past. For the following interaction, we consider several scenarios, namely whether 
individuals can choose partners before the interaction takes place, the structure of the 
game itself (IR, IPD, IPGG), and whether individuals can punish each other after the 
interaction. If partners are chosen, we predict that only loved punishers are ever preferred 
as partners as much (or even more than) non punishing cooperators (NPC). The fear 
reputation of punishment is valid whenever players are forced to interact with one another 
and punishment remains an option in the game to be played. In the absence of 
punishment, we predict that only loved punishers receive voluntary help as much as NPC. 
Scenarios where acquiring a punitive reputation could  could be under positive selection 
(assuming that the punisher's cooperativeness is directly inferred) are highlighted in red. 
Abbreviations: IR=Indirect Reciprocity Game, IPD=Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma, 





















Game to be played Punisher's reputation 
 
 Antisocial Competitive, 




IR or IPD 






but ≤ NPC 
IR or IPD 






punishers; = NPC 
IPGG 
+ partner choice 
+ punishment 
Avoided Intermediate preference or punishers might 
be preferred over NPC where defectors 
cannot be easily excluded from the game  
IPGG 
+ partner choice 
- punishment 
Avoided Intermediate 




punishers; = NPC 
IR 
- partner choice 
+ punishment 
No help Punishers receive more help than NPC 
IR 
- partner choice 
- punishment 
No help No help Help = NPC 
IPD 
- partner choice 
+ punishment 
Defect Cooperation 





- partner choice 
- punishment 
Defect Cooperation 
received  ≤ NPC 
Cooperation received  
= NPC 
IPGG 
- partner choice 
+ punishment 
Depends what strategy 
other group members 
play 
Cooperation 





- partner choice 
- punishment 
Levels of cooperation will be generally low 
 
